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Abstract  
 
While in past, most studies have taken self-determination movements as unitary actors, 
recent research has shown that many movements striving for self-governance are highly 
fragmented. Taking this as a starting point, this thesis offers an alternative explanation of 
state’s decision making process in complex situations as active intra-state conflicts. By 
facing the factions of the self-determination movement, states have to endure great levels 
of violence and pressures. These push the ‘rational’ state to a take a decision. Through an 
analysis of the Tamil and Jumma movement in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh respectively, 
this study outlines the dynamics of group fragmentation and addresses its overall 
implications. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Intra-state conflicts have troubled history for decades. Reaching an agreement in 
countries that have experienced years of violent ethnic conflict has historically proven to 
be a path marked by difficulties and failure. Examples from the past show that self-
determination conflicts have been among “the most persistent and destructive forms of 
warfare” (Weller, Metzger & Johnston, 2008: xi). With a wearisome nature and a 
people’s crushed hopes for independence at its core, self-determination struggles pose 
serious challenges to all those involved. Failures of conflict resolution can result in years 
or even decades of violent struggle. Conflicting interests between the self-determination 
movement (SDM) and the central government then often produce situations of 
destabilization, which further add to an already tense situation. Negotiating conflicts in 
general is complex and requires profound knowledge of the situation at hand. Negotiating 
self-determination disputes has proven to be even more convoluted. Moreover, usually 
the international community is limited in its possibilities of intervention, due to the issue 
of national sovereignty. Even if they intervene, international surveillance, such as 
supervision by internationally renowned organizations and mediated agreements, do not 
automatically trigger mechanisms that cause the conflict to end. As the example of 
Rwanda shows, an unsatisfying agreement can even result in the escalation of the conflict; 
the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement was signed, but after that genocide tormented the 
country (Noel, 2005: ix). This shows that an agreement does not necessarily lead to a 
certain outcome, in this case peace. 
 While durable peace can be seen as the final goal of most countries, an end of 
conflict already represents a success for many. Yet some states are unwilling to negotiate 
or agree to a compromise with SDMs. While power-sharing agreements and institutions 
might provide an appealing solution to the conflict, as shared responsibilities and 
institutions are believed to turn political opponents into cooperating partners the states’ 
realist perception of events often contradicts such solutions. However, some states still 
have granted a certain degree of self-government to SDMs operating on national territory. 
For instance, the Bodos in India were granted regional autonomy in 2003, after years of 
heavy guerrilla fighting (Benedikter, 2009: 112). Other self-determination movements, 
such as the Balochs in Pakistan were less successful in achieving their goal of autonomy 
(Benedikter, 2009: 66). Why do states grant self-determination to some movements, but 
not to others? Scholars have examined SDMs to gain insight into the dynamics of these 
movements. Self-determination groups and movements are often taken as unitary actors 
and assumed to hold a shared ethnic identity. Only recently has this perception of SDMs 
as unitary actors progressed to a more contemporary approach, which considers the 
SDMs as frequently divided (Cunningham, Bakke, Seymour, 2012a). This study will 
examine what causes states to take a certain course of action and consequently 
accommodate demands of some, but not other movements. Building on the existing 
research claiming that internal group divisions are of significance in conflicts and civil 
wars, this study will aim to fill the existing gap of research concerning internally divided 
SDMs and their struggles for self-governance; how and through what means SDMs 
impact the process towards peace and the peace agreement itself has not been addressed 
adequately. By examining the circumstantial influences and interactions of the self-
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determination movements and their home state, this study will aim to answer the 
following question: Why do some states agree to the claims of self-determination 
movements, but not others?  
 Chapter 2 will first lay out the methodology and the theoretical basis for the 
analysis. By passing on to an overview of the behavioural patterns of a rationalist state in 
Chapter 3, the considerations of the central government will be examined. Then, in 
Chapter 4 the concept of group fragmentation and its effects will be explained. Through a 
comparative case study of the Sri Lankan and Bengali SDMs, the effects of group 
fragmentation can be assessed and will show that increased levels of violence and 
pressures to the state (internal and external) can result in a decision of the state, which is 
accommodating the claims of one or more SDMs. Finally, Chapter 5 will give an 
overview of the findings and outline the concluding arguments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Theoretical and Methodological Foundations  
 
The following chapter will lay out the theoretical foundations, and give insight into the 
methodology, as well as the historical backgrounds of the two case studies - Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh  - examined in this thesis.  
2.1 Literature Review 
 
The amount of scholarly research devoted to self-determination conflicts and the 
solutions of intrastate conflicts has significantly increased in recent years (e.g. Weller, 
Metzger & Johnston, 2008; Weller, 2009; Benedikter, 2009; Cordell & Wolff, 2010). The 
drive of national and indigenous people for self – governance has increasingly pushed 
self – determination conflicts in the centre of international relations’ debates. Self-
determination conflicts are among the most violent forms of civil wars that today’s 
modern societies can experience (Mashall & Gurr, 2005). As of 2008, there were 26 
ongoing self-determination conflicts, of which some underwent a “more or less linear 
progression” to negotiations and settlements (Quinn, 2008: 14) and others witnessed 
incidences of violent internal armed conflict (Weller, 2009:113). Self-determination 
conflicts often result out of contrasting standpoints of ethnically diverse groups. However, 
while extensive literature on has focused on conflicts between ethnic groups (Horowitz, 
1985; Varshney, 2001), but only little attention has been dedicated to the complex 
mechanisms within ethnic groups (Warren & Troy, 2011:2).  
In the past, SDMs have been considered as unitary actors, however recent 
research points out that is only rarely the case. Groups striving for greater recognition, 
more comprehensive self-determination or independence from their central government 
in, for example, India, Myanmar, Philippines, Bangladesh or Sudan are often divided by 
the pursuit of different goals. The impact of group fragmentation on the academic 
literature has since grown and caused scholars to confront themselves with the concept.    
Cunningham (2006) analyzed the duration of civil wars and argued that through 
the introduction of ‘veto players’ - multiple actors -who have to approve a certain kind of 
agreement - conflicts are more likely to become intractable. The cause was to be found in 
the low acceptance level of the ‘veto players’. Through a cross-national examination, 
Warren and Troy (2011) have analyzed the logic of intra-ethnic conflicts and the 
conditions which cause ‘violent, fragmentary conflict’ to persist within ethnic minorities 
who are politically active. They proposed a two-level model of intra-ethnic conflict 
which predicts that ethnic violence is a consequence of the interaction between the 
various sub-group actors and the states oppressive behaviour. Pearlman (2008/2009) 
opted for a different approach of looking at group fragmentation by examining how the 
latter influences the process of the conflict and/or negotiations through negotiating and 
spoiling. Nationalist revolts in colonial states and the divide among smaller groups, for 
which pursuing the same goal becomes rather complex, were the central subjects in the 
study of Lawrence (2010). The contributions of Walters (2006), Reilly (2001), Caspersen 
(2006) and Varshney (2001), who through the study of ethnic conflicts unravel dynamics 
of internal group divisions, can be allocated along similar lines. A different approach to 
the concept take scholars such as Staniland (2012) or Kalyvas (2008) who give major 
importance to the concept of ethnic defection, which means that some ethnic groups fail 
to join their forces during civil wars and therefore choose to join organizations “explicitly 
opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group” (Kalyvas, 2008: 1045). 
 As can be deducted from above, the existing literature on internally divided 
movements in ethnic and intrastate conflicts is somewhat limited. Even more restricted is 
the research dedicated to the answer the question of why states choose to opt for certain 
decision in the setting of self-determination conflicts. The study by Cunningham, Bakke 
and Seymour (2012a), could therefore be considered a unique contribution to the main 
argument of this thesis, since the three scholars focused on group fragmentation and their 
effect on the process of self – determination conflicts and question so the nature of non-
state actors as unitary ones. One of Cunningham’s most recent publications ‘Divide and 
Conquer or Divide and Concede’ (2011) adds to her previous collaborated study by 
offering another interesting theoretical approach for the aim of this study. In her study 
she examines how states respond to internally divided societies, by conducting a general 
analysis on self-determination movements. With group fragmentation as the core 
argument Cunningham examines why states might agree to power-sharing or peace 
agreements.  
As this brief review of the existing literature shows, much research has been done 
on the concept of self-determination conflicts. Not quite as much attention has been 
dedicated to group fragmentations. However, almost no research combining the two 
concepts of SDMs and internal group fragmentation has been conducted. The aim of this 
study is to fill this gap by focusing on the various aspects of internal group fragmentation 
in the concrete cases of self- determination conflicts and so add to the very scarce 
existing literature through the attempt to unravel the conditions which cause states to 
grant self-determination to some movements and groups, but not to others.  
Scholars of political science have used different theoretical approaches to explain 
intra-state conflicts. However, most theoretical IR approaches reach their limits when 
confronted with the complex reality of self-determination disputes, multiparty 
negotiations and state’s decision making process. Building on its comprehensive and 
contemporary nature, rationalism offers the adequate approach for this study.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework  
2.2.1 Rationalism in International Relations 
 
Rationalism is one of the major theoretical approaches to the study of international 
relations (IR). Occupying a middle approach between realism and liberalism, theorists of 
rationalism (or rational choice theory) build on some of the key elements of traditional IR 
theories, by including them into their own framework. Consequently, while on one hand 
the realist concept of power is perceived in an attenuated matter, liberalists notions such 
as the rule of law, institutions and international organizations are also part of the 
rationalist framework.  
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2.2.2 What is Rationalism (or Rational Choice Theory)? 
 
Rationalism, (or rational choice theory) is a ‘subset of methodological individualism’, 
which presumes that actors are acting rationally (Reus-Smit & Snidal, 2008: 429). The 
actors’ rationality is based on the assumption that actors have certain preferences for a 
desired outcome. Rationalist scholars take actors’ preferences as fixed and as the result of 
a thorough cost benefit analysis. Categorized and positioned in terms of priority, 
preferences are aimed to assure the achievement of the optimal outcome (Reus-Smit & 
Snidal, 2008: 429). Optimal outcomes reflect maximized utility (which does not 
necessarily have to be motivated by economic incentives) 1 and can be achieved through 
the pursuit of a rational strategy, which again is formed by transitive preferences (Reus-
Smit & Snidal, 2008: 429). Transitive preferences are here understood as follow: if actors 
prefer peace to stalemate, and stalemate over conflict, then the actor must prefer peace 
over conflict. One might wonder how and based on what criteria these strategies are 
created. Actors develop strategies based on their current level information and 
capabilities, which allow them to assess the situation and carefully weigh their options.  
2.2.3 Rationalism and Self-Determination Conflicts  
 
In the past, researchers have used different approaches to explain and study intrastate 
relations and conflicts. However, self-determination conflicts, multiparty relations 
(including relations between states and nonstate actors) and the states’ decision making 
processes are particularly complex subjects, which often clash with the theoretical 
limitations of some IR theories. Building on Pearlman and Cunningham’s definition 
(2012), nonstate actors are here perceived as actors which are not strictly related to the 
state, but threathening one of its vital interests. For clarity, international organizations 
and non –governmental organizations (NGOs) are here referred to as ‘non-state actors’ 
while a SDM and its factions are non –state actors.2 The growing presence of nonstate 
actors in intrastate conflicts has however shed additional light on relations between states 
and SDMs and so highlighted the need for a comprehensive approach, explaining the link 
between these two parties (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012: 4). Scholars such as Kenneth 
Waltz stressed the point that “states are not and never have been the only actors… The 
importance of nonstate actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious" 
(Waltz, 1979: 93-4). Rationalism offers a theoretical framework to the research question 
here examined, namely why states grant self-determination to some movements but not to 
others, because of one main reason: states’ main interest, or preference, is maintaining 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is here not relying on one single definition, but rather on a 
broader interpretation which combines the concepts of authority and territory. This study 
understands sovereignty as a characteristic of modern states and foresees maintaining the 
                                                 
1 This is contrary to the approaches of several scholars (see Ingelehart, 1990; Abelson ,1996). 
2 Even though ‘non-state actors’ can also significantly harm the state, if e.g. a reputable organizations 
issues a report accusing certain actions of the state and thus sheds light on disputable behavior a significant 
economic deal or international agreement could fail to come into existence. Since these situations only 
rarely pose a threat to the country’s vital interests, a clear distinction between the two interpretations of non 
–state actors needs to be made.  
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control and authority over a defined territory, limited by national borders.3 The authority 
is legitimate when “it is rooted in law, tradition, consent or divine command and when 
those loving under it generally endorse this notion (Philpott, 1995: 355). The difference 
between internal and external sovereignty needs to be specified. Internal sovereignty 
refers to the “supremacy over all authorise within that territory and population” (Bull, 
2002: 8). External sovereignty on the other hand is twofold, since it refers partly to 
“constitutional and practical independence” (Hannum, 1990: 15) and partly to “the 
totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law as residing in an 
independent territorial unit – the state” (Crawford, 1979:26). The concept of sovereignty 
is closely related with security. Threats to national sovereignty can be perceived as loss 
of control and security. Uncertainty and insufficient information can result in an 
incomplete insight in the situation and consequently produce negative consequences. The 
dilemma state are finding themselves in, is a security dilemma. Scholars of international 
relations have emphasized that states must take certain measures to guarantee their own 
security and to maintain their standing in the international community (Jervis, 1978; 
Hartzell 1999). The security dilemma builds on the idea that in absence of any central 
authority a state needs to gather an extra margin of safety, in order to gain of a certain 
level of flexibility when responding to threats (Hartzell, 1999: 5). According to the 
traditional interpretation of the concept, the problem arises when states notice and are 
negatively impacted by the threats from other states. Posen (1993) takes the security 
dilemma and transfers it onto the ethnic context. When confronted with the claims of 
SDMs, it would appear rational for states to respond to them. In the contrary case, states 
would inevitably preclude themselves from pursuing their strategy of maximized utility.   
In the study ‘Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How do States 
Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?’ Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham outlines an 
argument, which adds to the rationalist approach aforementioned. Cunningham 
arguments that states can respond to internally divided SDMs in two possible ways: 
either they can try to ‘divide and conquer’ or they try to ‘divide and concede’. The author 
outlines that the frequency with which states give concessions to the divided SDMs and 
the effects of these concessions supports the idea that states follow a divide and concede 
logic – using concessions strategically without attempting to settle underlying disputes 
(Cunningham, 2011: 295). This does not necessarily have to conflict with the rationalist 
idea – while the underlying dispute might not be resolved, the outcome might still 
correspond to the state’s preferences (e.g. maintaining sovereignty through accepting a 
suboptimal outcome, such as stalemate instead of peace). She adds that states, when 
facing unitary actors, are less likely to make concessions, but in case they do, the 
concessions contribute to the resolution of the conflict. When states however follow the 
divide and conquer logic, then states are more likely to fight internally divided SDMs, 
because there are significant barriers to a negotiated settlement with them. This implies 
that states use concessions not only as a tool to resolve disputes, but also as part of a 
bargaining process.  
Consequently, if a state finds itself confronted with having to respond to demands 
of self-determination, independence or greater recognition, it has three options. First, it 
refuses to agree to anything, second, it agrees or third, it does not react at all. Generally it 
                                                 
3 Sovereignty is not understood in terms of absolute sovereignty, but only as supreme sovereignty. For an 
extensive explanation of the difference absolute and supreme sovereignty see Philpott (1995: 357-359).  
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can be stated that, when confronted with a number of options, “he [the rational actor] will 
always choose the one he prefers, i.e., the one with the larger utility” (Luke & Raiffa, 
1957: 55).Based on these considerations, states would be expected to reject any demands 
aiming for a self-determination agreement. States, acting as rational actors, would not 
accept any agreement which would decrease their control or impact their level of 
sovereignty, because it would not correspond to their preferences and their strategy aimed 
at achieving the best possible outcome would be violates. It would therefore be the states’ 
rational choice not to grant any kind of agreement. 
 However, in most cases SDM might not be willing to accept the state’s decision, 
especially if their cultural and basic human rights have been systematically undermined 
in the past. As numerous historical examples show the large majority of SDMs will not 
be willing to accept a similar decision of the state and will continue to push for their aim. 
Yet, as states risk their stability to be threatened and their sovereignty to be affected, 
would they maintain the negative position towards demands of self-determination? 
Adjusting their standpoint, would signify an adjustment of preference and therefore a 
decrease in their sovereignty. How can a states’ decision granting self-determination then 
be explained? Contrary to what might initially be labelled as ‘irrational’ behaviour, a 
state’s decision to consent a certain degree of self-determination can follow a concrete 
logic. The reasoning is the following: States will only then find themselves in the position 
of having to make a decision when there is already one or more SDM present in the 
country. It would therefore not represent an unexpected new detail, but rather it would 
have been part of the information which had already been available to the states for some 
time. Consequently, it can be assumed that since the states are rational actors, and they 
are developing their preferences and then their strategies, based on the information and 
capabilities available to them, if they are opting for an agreement, then it is part of their 
rational strategy. The state was aware of the fragmentation the national SDM and 
therefore, this information would have been already part of the elaboration of the state’s 
strategy. Consequently, the state’s preferences would not be adjusted, since the optimal 
outcome would still be the maintenance of sovereignty and the strategy still the result of a 
rational cost-benefit analysis. Granting self-determination can therefore still be a rational 
choice, aiming towards the maintenance of sovereignty. Contrary to the states’ first 
option (no agreement), showing willingness to collaborate, hear the SDM concerns and 
agree would reflect a long-term approach. Implications that could be caused by the SDM 
as a reaction to the denial (or non-consideration) of an agreement could range from 
violence (internal) to pressures (in – and external) to international repercussions 
(external). These circumstance might present themselves as a ‘hurting stalemate’, which 
would then cause the actors to rationally choose for the most beneficial outcome 
(Zartman, 2001: 8).While rationalists perceive sovereignty as a key element and as a 
state’s right, they would be willing – under certain circumstances – to bend their concept 
of sovereignty in order to pursue a certain outcome, such as a long-term goal (Kydd, 
2010: 103). This outcome would be the result of the state’s willingness to accommodate 
demands and therefore an agreement. Finally, besides the state’s option of agreeing and 
not agreeing, states can choose to not react to the demands or SDMs. However, since no 
reaction to outside impulses would eventually still require decisions - positive or negative 
– this option will here not be further examined.  
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 Based on the logic outlined above, we can therefore assume that since states are 
rational actors, they would follow cost-benefit logic and pursue a rational strategy aiming 
towards a specific outcome. This implies that the higher the benefit for the state, the 
higher is the likelihood for the state to grant an agreement to the SDM. At the same time, 
the higher the cost, the lower is the probability for the state to grant an agreement. The 
recognition that states might form their decision based on a certain strategy, formed 
through preferences and aiming towards the aim of maximized utility offers an adequate 
starting point to this analysis.  
  
2.2.4 Rationalist Approach to Fragmented SDMs 
 
Self-determination conflicts are among the most violent forms of civil wars that today’s 
modern societies can experience. (Marshall & Gurr, 2005). In the past, disputes between 
states and SDMs have been treated as conflicts between two unitary actors. Only recently, 
scholars of self-determination conflicts have focused on outlining the importance of 
treating SDMs as fragmented entities. 
 Multiple factions within a SDM cause the already convoluted reality of self-
determination conflicts and its “complex and ambiguous processes” to further gain 
complexity (Kalyvas, 2003: 475). We can assume that internal fragmentation of SDM 
would signify that states are confronted with multiple demands from several groups. One 
group might pursue independence, while the other might ask for regional autonomy. 
Already the existence of various factions implies that these groups are pursing different 
goals and therefore are not willing to join and present themselves as a coherent group. As 
difficulties between these groups emerge, states can be assumed to be interested in 
resolving the issue (e.g. approve an agreement). Protests, violence towards the state and 
among the various factions, external and internal pressures causing so threats to national 
sovereignty, lead to the assumption that a high number of faction within a SMD, will 
cause the state to opt for a positive decision (an agreement) towards the SDM.  
Due to the conflicting nature of internal group fragmentation, we would expect 
that the different factions would only scarcely or not at all communicate with each other 
and distrust in the information available to them. Therefore information and credibility 
problems could be the consequence. This would generate a tense environment, which 
would at a certain point culminate into a situation of conflict. In such occasions, violence 
often enters the equation. Violence among the various factions of the SDM, but also 
against the state and its officials, often implies negative consequences for the general 
civilian population (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006; K. G. Cunningham, Bakke, & 
Seymour, 2012a: 75). Violations of the national stability, as well as civilian casualties put 
great pressure on the government. On one hand the pressure will come from the general 
population, on the other international partners, human rights organizations, NGOs etc, 
might raise additional awareness to the situation, causing the state ‘unpleasant’ media 
attention. The state would find itself in a situation similar to one of a mutually hurting 
stalemate, in which in would act in order to not be ‘hurt’ further.4 
                                                 
4 For more information about mutually hurting stalemates see Zartman, (2001).  
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Hypothesis 1: Internal group fragmentation increases the likelihood of states agreeing to 
an agreement (concessions) 
 
Causal Path:  Internal group fragmentation of SDMs increases the level of violence. It 
also causes internal and external pressure to the state. The higher the pressures, the 
greater the chance of an agreement will be. Violence and Pressures affect each other. See 
Graph 1 for a visualization of the causal path.   
 
 
 
Graph 1 
 
 
While Hypothesis 1 refers to relation between the number of factions and an agreement in 
general, it does not comment on the degree of concession a state would be willing to 
make. The presence of multiple factions let us assume that, multiple demands will be 
presented5,  which allows the states to strategically choose what to grant to who. We can 
therefore assume that multiple factions decrease the degree of concessions towards the 
SDM.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the number of factions within a SDM, the smaller will be the 
level of concessions that the state will agree to [not satisfying or no agreement].  
 
With extreme levels of fragmentations within a SDM, it can be assumed that also the 
levels of violence and in – as well as external pressures would be above any reasonable 
number. These bring about major commitment problems, which a rational actor would 
                                                 
5 Disagreements with the leadership or the factions orientation do not necessarily have to end up in multiple 
demands towards the central government. Factions can also decide not to present any demands at all.  
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hardly be able to overcome. As extreme levels of fragmentation continue to persist 
throughout the conflict, the central government would most likely opt for ‘no agreement’. 
However, this might change if the entity of concern (e.g. territory) is particularly valuable.   
 
2.3 Research Design  
2.3.1 Concepts and Variables  
 
The central topic of this thesis – internal group fragmentation of SDMs – requires a 
comprehensive understanding of a series of concepts and variables.  
 Self-determination conflicts reflect the hopes and expectations of minority, ethnic, 
indigenous or other groups for freedom, recognition and independence (Weller, Metzger 
& Johnston 2008: xi). The concept of self-determination is anchored in the UN Charter 
since the end of World War II and calls upon the nations 
 
[…] to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace (UN Charter, Chapter 1, 
art. 1, sect. 2).  
 
According to the principle of self-determination people have the right to determine their 
own destiny, which includes the choice of their political status, their economic, social and 
cultural development (UNPO, 2006). SDMs are the groups who are fighting6 for these 
aims, are self-determination movements. Self-determination conflicts take place when 
self-determination movements (SDMs) decide to enforce these rights and so challenge the 
central government and national sovereignty. These movements might aim for 
independence (such as the Naga in India), secessionism, territorial/regional autonomy 
(such as the Bodo in India) or the protection of cultural/ideological/religious/linguistic 
rights. As this shows, different groups pursue different aims and just as this is the case for 
separate SDMs, this can also be the case if different factions within a single SDM do not 
follow the same aim. The consequence is group fragmentation, which here explains the 
divisions of SDM.  
 The key independent variable is group fragmentation. This variable refers to the 
various factions that often divide a group or a movement in a self-determination conflict. 
SDMs might start standing up against the central government of their home state as a 
unitary actor, but often the dynamics of the self-determination process cause the group to 
split and to then form another group with similar or different aims as the original 
movement. SDMs might split into one or more factions and depending on the number of 
divisions other factors might be affected. Conceptualizing fragmentation has been at the 
centre of the study of Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour (2012b), who examined the 
various dynamics within a group and pointed out that the effects caused by fragmentation 
depend on how a group is fragmented. Based on these considerations, this study will 
consider the movements which are divided into less than five factions as movements 
manifesting minor fragmentation. SDMs with more than five and less than ten factions 
                                                 
6 Fighting is here understood metaphorically and does imply the use of nonviolent means.  
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will be considered highly fragmentation, while movements with more than ten factions 
are considered extremely fragmented.  
 The dependent variable of this study is level of accommodation. This variable 
reflects the state’s decision of whether it intends to grant self-determination or not. This 
includes peace, power-sharing or any other kind of agreement (e.g. regional autonomy) or 
no agreement at all (states grants no self-determination). Whether parties have complied 
with the agreement or whether the conflict has restarted and continued after the 
agreement will not be taken into consideration, since the aim of this study is to examine 
what causes the states to decide in a certain way rather than in another. An agreement or 
no agreement, do therefore form the dependent variable of this study.  
 Other variables which need to be taken into considerations are the intervening 
variables violence and pressure.7 Violence is understood as defined by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and therefore as 
 
The international use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in 
or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation (Krug, et al., 2002: 5) 
 
 This definition of the WHO offers a broad interpretation of violence, which 
emphasises the correlation of the intentionality with ‘the committing of the act itself’ 
(Krug et all, 2002: 5). Besides ‘use of physical force’, the definition also includes the 
word ‘power’, which puts emphasis on acts which are caused by power relations, such as 
threats and intimidations .8 The definition also refers to the various targets of violence, 
such as ‘group or community’ and so hints to the possible directions of violence: 
horizontal or vertical violence. Horizontal violence refers to inter-group violence, while 
vertical violence indicates violent acts between the state and the various groups. The 
intensity of the violence will also be taken into considerations (how?).  
The second intervening variable – pressure - concerns the effect an entity 
(individual, group, state, organization etc.) can cause on another entity, in order to 
promote its perception of a certain idea, standpoint or concept. In this study the main 
target entity is the state or central government. The variable is includes two types of 
pressure: internal and external pressures. Both pressures are perceived as a threat to 
national sovereignty, even the approach might be different. Internal pressures refer to 
pressures exercised by entities within the state. This includes pressures by the various 
factions from the SDM, the opposition parties, national organizations, civilian population 
or national media. Internal pressures could manifest themselves in different ways and 
depending on the target through protest, petitions, negative press coverage or shifts in 
power relations. External pressures come from outside parties, such as other states, 
international organizations, individuals in international key positions – simply members 
of the international community. Typical external or outside pressures are economic 
sanctions, change in the power relations with other international parties, altered 
international standing and potential exclusion of international events and mechanisms. 
Both, internal and external pressures cause a certain effect, which the target entity – here 
                                                 
7  Intervening variables are ‘variables framing intervening phenomenon included in a causal theory’s 
explanation’ (Van Evera 1997: 11)  
8 For a more detailed explanation of the definition, see WHO (2002).  
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the state - would perceive as ‘unpleasant’ and as attempt of coercion towards a certain act 
(e.g. decision).  
2.3.2 Methodology 
 
In testing the hypotheses related to the state’s motivations of whether or not to grant self-
determination, I will rely on a qualitative study. In the recently emerged shift towards the 
study of fragmentation, scholars mainly conducted quantitative and large N-studies to 
gain information on the possible effects of group fragmentation on the self-determination 
process. In contrast thereto, this study approaches the subject through a comparative case 
study.  
 The method of analysis used in this study will be process tracing. The reason for 
the use of process tracing lies in the fact that this method of analysis offers a unique way 
of assessing causal patters between the independent and dependent variables which might 
lead to similar outcomes in different situations (George & Bennett 2004: 215).  
 In order to investigate the states decisions and the importance of group 
fragmentation in SDMs, a comparative case study will be used. Because of the somewhat 
limited scholarly attention dedicated to the subject, a comparative case study will make it 
possible for the elements of group fragmentation to be outline and see how they affect 
process of the dispute. In order to accurately outline and to closely examine the restricted 
number of cases and the various elements of the concepts mentioned, a quantitative 
analysis would not be adequate. However, the advantages of a qualitative comparative 
case study are several. First, individual cases can be examined carefully. They allow 
researchers to achieve high levels of ‘conceptual validity’ (George & Bennett, 2004: 19). 
Second, it allows complex cases to be analyzed appropriately and to challenge theoretical 
assumptions. A disadvantage, on the other hand, could be the trap of ‘case selection bias’ 
(George & Bennett, 2004: 22-4). Systematic errors in the design of the study are more 
likely to occur in qualitative than in quantitative studies (George & Bennett, 2004: 23) 
While one needs to keep in mind that the findings of case studies cannot be generalized 
and can only rarely be applied to other cases, an aim is to find elements of power sharing 
which might be valid for more than the cases outlined (George & Bennett, 2004: 112-15).  
2.3.3 Case Selection  
 
The cases of the comparative study are self-determination conflicts in the 
following two areas: Sri Lanka and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. The cases 
have been chosen, because of particular historical relevance. Sri Lanka offers a good 
example for the arguments of this study, because it is home to the self –determination 
conflict of the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government. Part of the conflict were also 
the Tamil paramilitaries, who support the Sri Lankan government. Despite the fact that 
the SDM was fractionalized, no peace agreement been signed yet.  
The ethnic people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, generally referred to as Jumma or 
High Landers, were involved in a similarly long self-determination conflict, but did 
achieve a peace agreement in 1997. The Accord recognized the CHT as a ‘tribal 
inhabited’ area and introduced special political arrangements for the formation of 
regional authorities. Also in this case the SDM was split in multiple smaller groups 
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The two cases show a number of common characteristics, but different outcomes, 
which causes them to present adequate examples for the case study of this thesis. While 
both cases experienced high levels of violence and pressures, they differed in other 
aspects, such as the central government’s standing towards agreement and negotiations.   
2.3.4 Data  
 
Building on previous large N-studies, the main data for this study comes from primary 
and secondary written sources. Due to the scarce access to primary data, the information 
from primary data is limited. It includes for instance collections of statements of 
witnesses of the conflict (Khan, Khan & Kaiser, 1994). Moreover, due to the fact that 
part of the government issued documents could present a certain bias  - since the central 
government presents one of the parties under examination – the majority of the data will 
however be provided by secondary documentation. In addition, the primary data 
constraints, forces the study to largely draw on political science literature. This secondary 
literature will involve scholarly research from the field of group fragmentation, self-
determination conflicts and agreements and historical/theoretical accounts in order to be 
able to trace the process of the self-determination conflicts and the path towards an 
agreement. Since detailed information about internal fragmentation of SDM in Sri Lanka, 
but especially in Bangladesh is very rare, only a wide range of secondary sources will 
make it possible to gain sufficient information. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) and the PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the related publications will provide a 
useful source for up-to date background information about peace agreements. Official 
government reports will be used, as well as media reports (regarding violent incidence 
and the progress of the conflict in general), and reports by human rights groups and 
organizations. The organizations, which closely followed the events in Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, include Amnesty International, UNPO (for the Jumma movement of the 
CHT), the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). The main focus of 
these organizations is the protection of human rights and the cultural heritage of minority, 
indigenous and ethnic people. Consequently it closely relates to the aim of this study.  
 
2.3.5 Scope and Limitations 
 
As mentioned above, the scope of this research is to add to the limited existing literature, 
by focusing on the impact of group fragmentation in self-determination conflicts. An 
emphasis of the study is to advance also the theoretical take on the subject. As outlined 
above, process tracing will offer an opportunity to examine the links between the 
examined variables. Moreover, it is often valuable for theory development (George & 
Bennett, 2004: 209). Since this study aims to fill the currently existing gap, a comparative 
case analyses will  be able to point out the relation between intra-group fragmentation of 
SDM and the likelihood of reaching an agreement. It will also show, how violence and in 
-  and external pressures can influence the decision making process, as well as the fact 
that states are rationally acting actors. The findings of this study could then be included in 
the process of analysis of other self-determination conflicts as well and so contribute to 
the scholarly literature. Also, a confirmation of the hypothesis would grant more 
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credibility to the concept of group fragmentation and to Cunningham’s (2011) argument 
of divided non-state actors.  
 While the benefits of the study are clearly visible and significant, the possible 
limitations need to be considered as well. One limitation of this study could be the 
inherent limitations of conducting a comparative case study are the limited amount of 
cases examined and therefore the fact that it might be difficult to generalize the findings. 
Another shortcoming could be the selection of the cases. The selection of an outlier case 
might have contributed to a more convincing argument. Also, since the cases will be from 
the same geographical area, it might not be possible to extend the findings to other areas. 
Moreover, certain decisive factors could not be valued properly, such as climate change 
(could determine an increase/decrease in the level of violence). 
 Moreover, as this study addresses a great and highly complex subject, which 
encompasses dynamics ranging from the international to almost the interpersonal level, 
decisive factors might have been assumed as given. Nevertheless, this study will offer a 
needed overview and long –due research of group fragmentation and state’s decision 
making process.  
 
2.4 Historical Background  
 
Through a closer analysis of the dynamics of intra-group fragmentation in self-
determination conflicts, such as in Sri Lanka and in the highlands of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts in Bangladesh, the state’s motivations and the dynamics and complexities of the 
conflict can be fully embraced. A brief historical overview of both cases offers therefore 
a good starting point.  
2.4.1 Sri Lanka – A History of Violence  
 
Sri Lanka – the island just off the southern coast of India in South Asia is thorn between 
representing a thriving tourist location on one side and a long ongoing self-determination 
conflict on the other. The small island with a population of only about 20 million has 
been subjected to a troubled history since it gained independence from the British rule in 
1948 (Goodhand, Korf & Spencer, 2011: 40). The origins of the 30 year long conflict 
involving the countries’ three major ethnic groups – the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims – 
and the national government have been widely documented. Sri Lanka experienced an 
ethnic conflict which since 1983 went through four conflict phases (Eelam I-IV), “several 
failed ceasefires and peace negotiations, as well as a disastrous military intervention by 
the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF)” (Goodhand, Korf & Spencer, 2011: 74). The 
initial three phases are of primary importance for this study, since they encompass the 
period when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) gained its influence and 
turned into a strong adversary for its opposition. The geographic distribution of the ethnic 
groups featuring the Tamils on one side and Sinhalese and Muslims on the over, is 
relevant for the understanding of the conflict. The Sri Lankan Tamils “are the majority in 
their ‘traditional homelands’ of Jaffna, Vavuniya, Batticaloa and Trincomalee” while the 
Indian Tamils are mainly located in the central highlands of Nuwara Eliya and Badulla 
districts (Bloom, 2003: 56). According to the 2001 national census, the distribution of the 
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ethnic groups in the country breaks down to 74% Sinhalese, 18% Tamils (whereas 6% 
belong to the Indian Tamils and 12% to the Sri Lankan Tamils) and 7% Muslims 
(Department of Census and Statistics: Sri Lanka, 2001).9 
Sri Lanka’s conflict outlines how claims for self-governance can clash with a 
government, which is holding on to its national sovereignty. The Tamils minority’s 
political representation initially aimed at “democratically transforming Sri Lanka into a 
federal state” (Benedikter, 2009: 67). This aim of a certain degree of self-government for 
the Tamils, paired with an equal standing at the national level transformed with time into 
the main source of conflict (Benedikter, 2009: 67).  
After Ceylon gained full independence, Sinhala nationalism began to rise 
significantly and the Tamil minority living in the north and east of the country got 
increasingly marginalized. The situation further deteriorated through anti-Tamil riots10, 
which caused the deaths of hundreds of people and left thousands displaced (BBC, 2012). 
The discussion on language issues between the Sinhalese political parties and the Tamil 
minority created intense distrust among the two ethnic communities (Staniland, 2012: 22). 
The introduction of the 1972 Republican Constitution lead to a change in the island’s 
official name, from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, and Buddhism became the country’s first 
religion. 11  At the same time, Sinhalese was declared the official language and all 
remaining guarantees for the protection of minorities were abolished (Benedikter, 2009: 
67). To somewhat remediate the tense situation, the Sinhalese political elite granted the 
Tamil language the status of a ‘national language’, allowing so its use in circumstances of 
public administration. In addition, the distinction between citizens by descent was 
abolished permitting the Indian Tamils to obtain citizenship. These measures, intended to 
act as preventative actions of further conflict, did however not fulfill its objective. The 
Tamils perceived them as poor initiatives, which were offered way too late and were not 
reflecting serious intent of remedy. Consequently the tensions in the northeast of the 
country grew and laid the foundation for the beginning of a full-scale rebellion which 
starting from 1983 was to last for almost 30 years until the LTTE was wiped out in 2009 
(Benedikter, 2009:67). During 1987 and 1990 the IPKF was introduced into the Tamil 
territory to control the insurgency, but by the time it got withdrawn a significant Tamil 
movement against the counterinsurgency forces had been formed. Until 2009 the Tamils 
then managed to control large parts of the country’s north and east.  
Due to the absence of any provisional constitutional guarantee in the design of the 
country’s Soulbery Constitution of 1948, the Tamils openly fought for equal national 
treatment and self- determination since the very beginning (Benedikter, 2009: 67). The 
Sinhalese elite on the other hand strongly favored the dominant doctrine of a unitary state. 
Even though this position slightly changed throughout the conflict, partly due to the 
increasing amount of violence, the willingness of negotiations and the standing of the 
governing elite were rather rigid.  
                                                 
9 The data here mentioned features an approximation. For the exact numbers, see the Appendix, Table 1.  
10 Riots took place in 1956, 1958, 1978, 1981 and 1983. Among these violent encounters, the 1983 was 
particular brutal, “producing a vibrant Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora” (Uyangoda, 2007: 67). This Diaspora 
financially supported the struggle of the LTTE (Goodhand, Korf & Spencer, 2011: 180). 
11 It is important to point out, that for the LTTE the concept of religion was never at the heart of the conflict. 
However, when Buddhism was “given the primacy as a state religion by Mrs Bandaranaike in Chapter Two 
of the Constitution”, it was perceived as addition to the existing discriminations against Tamils (Bloom, 
2003: 61).  
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It was not until 2001, that the Norwegian government successfully mediated a 
ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tiger rebels (BBC, 2012). 
The road linking the Jaffna12area to the rest of the country was reopened for the first time 
since June 1990 to unrestricted travel (BBC, 2002) and the government lifted the ban on 
Tamil Tigers. The LTTE decided to drop the demand for a separate Tamil state in the 
island’s northeast, but wanted “regional autonomy and self-government” instead (The 
Asian Tribune, 2002). In the period after the signing of the ceasefire in 2002 an almost 
complete stop of violent incidences was registered. This drastically changed in 2004, 
when a faction of the LTTE broke away and caused the Tamil to pick up their arms again. 
The tsunami, which hit Sri Lanka’s east in December 2004, momentarily put the conflict 
on hold,13 but already in the second half of 2005, the situation was one of intense conflict 
again. In 2006 the attacks began to further escalate and despite various peace talks and 
efforts by foreign mediators, the situation did not reach an end until May 2009, when the 
LTTE was defeated.  
2.4.2 Ethnic people of Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh 
 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is a large area located in the south-east corner of 
Bangladesh, bordering the States of Tripura and Mizoram of India in the north and the 
Arkan Hills of Burma in the east. It covers an area which equals to approximately 10 
percent of the countries surface.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Table 1: Map of the location of the CHT (IWGIA, 2012). 
 
The population of the CHT includes 11 different indigenous ethnic groups 14  - 
Tanchangya, Tripura, Pankuh, Marma, Mru, Lushai, Khumi, Kheyang, Chak, Chakma 
                                                 
12 Jaffna is the capital of the Northern Province in Sri Lanka. 
13 While in other country’s a natural disaster, allowed conflicting parties to move beyond their differences  
(eg. in Indonesia the Aceh peace agreement was singed in 2005 and thus after the tsunami of December 
2004), in Sri Lanka, additional splits revived the hostilities (Goodhand, Korf & Spencer, 2011: 180). 
14 Scholars disagree on the exact number of ethnic groups. The number however ranges from 10 – 14 ethnic 
groups. See Benedikter, (2009: 100), Chowdhury, (2008:61), Arens & Chakma, (2002), etc.  
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and Bawm15 - which have settled in the CHT (Chowdhury, 2008: 61). These groups are 
collectively known as Jumma (High Landers) and differ significantly from the Bengali 
majority in ethnicity, language and religion. The three largest ethnic groups are the 
Chakma, the Marma, and the Tripura. In recent years the CHT have been divided into 
three separate hill districts: Khagrachari, Rangamati and Bandarban.16 According to the 
2011 Census of Bangladesh, the population of the three hill district is approximately 
1,587,000, of which an estimated 700,000 to 800,000 refers to the indigenous populations 
(IWGIA, 2012). Conflicting interests between the Jumma, the central Bangladeshi 
government and Bengali settlers in the CHT have in the past let to a two decade long self-
determination conflict.  
The conflict in the CHT has its origins in 1947, when the Indian Independence 
Act established the two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan. The decision of 
how to split the territory was based on religion and therefore split between the Hindu – 
dominated India and the Muslim dominated Pakistan (Arens & Chakma, 2002).17 As the 
CHT became part of East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) and therefore part of a state with 
a different religion than their own – 95% of the population of the CHT is non – Muslim 
(Mohsin, 2003: 16) – the Jumma people protested vehemently (ECC, 2002). However, to 
the great discontent of the Jumma, the decision was taken and was not to be changed. The 
1956 Constitution of Pakistan included a “special administrative status” for the CHT, as 
an ‘excluded area’ (Benedikter, 2009:100). In the following years, the Pakistani 
government increasingly amended the Regulation 1900, which was enacted in 1900 to 
protect the Jumma from the economic exploitation by non-indigenous people, and thus 
increasingly eroded the rights of the Jumma people (Larma, 2003: 1-2; Arens & Chakma, 
2002). Incidents like these caused the CHT Jumma people to gain political consciousness. 
In 1962, the construction of a hydroelectric dam at Kaptai left some 100,000 tribal 
people displaced, among which 70% were Chakma (Parveen & Faisal, 2002:197). A 
large number of the displaced people were forced to leave the country (many fled to the 
Indian state of Tripura) and became know as the Bara Parang, the great exodus (Parveen 
& Faisal, 2002: 202). The discriminative actions of the Bangladesh government against 
the CHT people, also included the state – sponsored resettlement of Bengalis from the 
plains to the CHT to change the ethnic and religious distribution of that part of the 
country “from a non-Muslim dominated area into Muslim dominated one” (Larma, 2003: 
2).18 The Bengali settlement in the area was seen as a counterinsurgency strategy, which 
would decrease the security risk that the government thought the ethnic people of the 
CHT would pose (Mohsin, 2003: 33, 37).  
 Bangladesh gained independence of Pakistan in 1971, after a nine moth of 
conflict (Arens & Chakma, 2002). As the Jumma were subjected to human rights 
violations as well as “harassment and exploitation by both law enforcement agencies and 
government – sponsored armed groups of Bengali settles”, they demanded recognitions 
                                                 
15 These ethnic groups are considered the original habitants of the CHT. The distinction between the ‘hill 
people’ and the Bengalis living in the CHT is important for the aim of this study.  
16 It is estimated that more than 90% of them are living in the districts of Rangamati and Khagrachari 
(Rahman, 2011). 
17 Others claim the decision was taken so that East Pakistan would have access to a port and to compensate 
the country for “its losses in the partitioning of Punjab” (Mohesin, 2003: 18-19) 
18 See Adnan, (2004) for detailed information about the settlement of the Bengalis.  
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of their rights and their status of indigenous people (Jamil & Panday, 2008:465). Their 
demands to the President Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman19 were:  
 
“a) autonomy for CHT with its own legislature, b)constitutional protection of 
the 1900 Resolution, c)continuation of the tribal chiefs’ offices and d) 
imposition of a ban on the influx of non-tribal people into CHT” (Benedikter, 
2009: 101) 
 
All demands were refused however rejected and the ethnic people of the CHT were 
advised to assimilate to the Bengalis (Benedikter, 2009: 101). The establishment of the 
Bengali constitution in 1972 was followed by the formation of a political party, the 
United People’s Party of the CHT, (Parbattya Chattagrm Janashonghoti Samity or PCSJJ) 
by  Manobendra Narayan Larma (Chowdhury, 2008: 66). A year later an armed wing, the 
Shanti Bahini (SB) was established (Parveen & Faisal, 2002: 203). The aims of the PCSJJ 
were to “secure political and economic autonomy within the state of Bangladesh” 
(Mohsin, 2003: 14).20 The PCSJJ was interested in advancing its concerns trough non-
violent means. However, as Sheikh Mujib Rahman was killed and the military declared 
war to the ethnic people of CHT, they opted for a more active approach. By the mid 
1970s, the conflict for recognition and protection of rights was in full motion.  
 The ethnic character of the conflict, which was caused by the government 
initiated settlement of Bengalis in the CHT, created a highly violent environment. Even 
though there was no explicit intervention in the self-determination conflict of the CHT, 
through donations outside actors pushed the conflicting parties for a settlement (Mohsin, 
2003: 14-5). After several round of negotiations failed, the entry of the Awami League 
with the changed the situation to the positive and brought to an agreement in 1997. The 
agreement granted limited autonomy to the Jumma people of the CHT. Even though the 
accord was not anchored constitutionally, it addressed a number of important issues.  
 
 
 
19 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was Bangladesh’s first President.  
20 A detailed outline of the aims of the Jumma can be found in Mohsin (2002).  
3. Rationalist State Behavior and Decision Making Process  
 
This chapter gives insight into the rational decision making process of states and how the 
presence of SDM can alter strategies and influence decisions.   
As globalization progresses, as states become increasingly interdependent, and as 
new non-state actors emerge on the stage, the concept of the state as a sovereign nation is 
questioned and challenged. The pursuit of indigenous, ethnic and minority groups for 
self-governance has altered the political landscape of countries and the entire 
international community in the past decade. States have been formed and movements 
were granted regional autonomies. Since the 1950s an impressive number of 72 self-
determination conflicts have taken place, the majority of which are still active (Marshall 
& Gurr, 2005: 19). What causes states to be unyielding towards SDMs in some situations, 
but not in others? Common explanations refer to the value at stake or the capabilities of 
the parties involved (Walter, 2006). SDMs do not have to aim merely for independence 
of their national government. Regional autonomy, recognition in the national constitution, 
protection of their culture, as well as fair employment opportunities are only some of the 
possible aims of SDMs. Consequently, the stakes in question do not have to be related to 
a defined territory, but can also present themselves in form of power and control 
(Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). However, groups concentrated to a specific territory 
are more likely to present claims for self-determination (e.g. Walter 2006; Jenne, 
Saideman, & Lowe, 2007; Wolff, Yakinthou, & Wolff, 2011) and their willingness to 
actively fight for their claims is higher (Hale, 2008; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Territorially 
concentrated or not, states are unlikely to concede control or part of the national territory 
to groups, when the contested entity is “economically, strategically, or psychologically 
valuable” (Walter, 2006: 313) to them. This lets governments appear to be purely 
interested in an immediate benefit, rather than having a long - term interest. Such a 
conclusion is however premature and downgrading the decision making process of the 
states. While a cost- benefit analysis presents the basis for rational deliberations, this 
study will show that governments’ decision making process is more complex and 
forward-looking than claimed.  
 As outlined above, self-determination conflicts are highly complex and despite 
their general decline, numerous armed self-determination conflicts are still ongoing (e.g. 
(Marshall & Gurr, 2005; Csergo & Wolff, 2009). Since scholars of intrastate conflict 
recognized that SDMs are for the most part fragmented - scholars have shown that when 
confronted with a fragmented opposition of non state actors, state do take that into 
considerations (Walters, 2006) - they have moved beyond the traditional perception of 
groups as unitary actors and examined the dynamics, causes and consequences of group 
fragmentation. When confronted with SDMs, states first initiative typically includes an 
assessment of their situation, which consist of a thorough analysis of the information 
available and their capabilities. However, rational actors – states – may also end up 
miscalculating the situation. If they do, it is because they took important decisions on the 
bases of imperfect information (Mearsheimer, 2009: 244). In the contrary case, states 
tailor their strategy on the basis of the result of the assessment. Rationalist actors are 
assumed to choose a strategy based on the highest probability of the desired outcome and 
therefore a strategy of maximized utility. For states faced with claims of self-governance 
this is the maintenance of control over national sovereignty. Threats to sovereignty, such 
as the once posed by SDMs, can transform into security problems and therefore need to 
be addressed carefully. An assessment of risk and the overall costs and benefits of 
whether to opt for one option rather than another, are therefore at the basis of any 
analysis. In cases of a fragmented SDM, states have to counter one or more claims for 
self-governance or recognition. The internal dynamics of the various factions influence 
whether some of them might present any claims at all. In cases with multiple weak 
factions, the level of internal organization might not allow the presentation of demands. 
On the other hand, states with a particularly ‘strong’ government21, might not consider 
any claims (Walter, 2006: 316). At the same time, the state needs to decide with who to 
negotiate and what to offer, since the risk of ‘spoilers’ can be high in these occasions 
(Cunningham & Butler, 2011: 3). The risk of spoilers is by far not the only cost states 
might encounter when confronted with SDMs. No reaction and action from the state 
might otherwise prolong or even escalate existing conflicts. Economic and social costs of 
a self-determination conflict can negatively impact the state. Economic costs can 
manifest themselves in form of greater military spending, which can reduce the economic 
growth of the country (Sambanis, 2004). Inter – group fragmentation can add further to 
the economic instability as scholars like Collier and Sambanis (2005) have shown. 
Moreover, self-determination conflicts and the uncertainty that is created through them in 
the national financial system can cause citizens to shift their wealth abroad in an attempt 
to protect their assets (Collier & Gunning, 1995). Self-determination conflicts can have 
devastating effects on social capital and on the economy in general (Colletta & Cullen, 
2002). However, much more significant are often the social costs, which first and 
foremost include fatalities. The great number of civilian causalities is not only a 
consequence of the conflict itself, but can also be the result of concrete strategies of the 
disputing parties. Accordingly military forces might target civilians and frame it as 
violent acts of the SDM. At the same time SDMs might use civilians to increase their 
resources (Azam & Hoeffler, 2002). Displacements or forced migrations include refugees 
and internally displaced persons - such as in Burma, Azerbaijan, Congo, Pakistan, 
Philippines and Sri Lanka - and present another aspect of self-determination conflicts’ 
social costs. Finally, negotiating with a SDM already implies that the state is recognizing 
its opposition (one or more) (Butler & Cunningham, 2011: 5). Recognizing the 
opposition could present itself as a cost for the state (Bapat, 2005). Commitment 
problems, information asymmetries, broken promises and changes in terms of capabilities 
on the side of the SDM can further add to the difficulties (Butler & Cunningham, 2011: 
3). Lake and Rothchild (1996), build on Fearon’s perception of the security dilemma, and 
state that “ethnic wars occurs mainly due to information failures and commitments 
problems” which are “precluding the groups so from achieving an agreement which 
would satisfy all the parties involved” (Kaufman, 2006: 46). Clearly, the issues here 
outline only present a fraction, even though a relevant one, of the costs of self-
determination conflicts. It is clear, that most of the costs outlined above are also 
consequences of conflict. This study is however examining why states grant self-
determination to some movements but not others. Yet, since states often either are in a 
situation of conflict with the SDM or might face a similar situation in the future, these 
costs need to be considered as a potential result of states’ decisions making process.  
                                                 
21 ‘Strong government’ here refers to an authoritarian regime.  
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 Generally, maximizing the benefit and keeping potential costs low represents the 
bases of rational decision making. When various factions within a SDM present their 
demands to their national government, the latter will only accommodate one or more of 
them, if the costs are too high to bear and if the benefits outweigh the costs. Each actor’s 
concessions are consequently measured relative to the sacrifices one would have to 
experience in the case of no agreement (Hooker, 2011). State would measure the benefits 
on how high or low their value. Thus, if a certain territory is e.g. particular rich of natural 
resources, of historical importance or valuable because of its trade routes, the costs need 
to be even higher than the loss of the territory. Studies have shown that in cases revolving 
around territories with a high strategic value, governments were 72% more likely to 
refuse any form of accommodation, than if the value was low (Walter, 2006: 319). 
Moreover, the states needs to evaluate whether fighting represents an option, whether it is 
too costly or whether an accommodation of one or more demands of the factions of the 
SDM a peaceful long term solution is their aim. The number of ethnic groups, the 
strategic value of the issue in question and the size of future populations have been 
proven to greatly impact the actions and decisions of national governments(Walter, 2006: 
319). Despite the usual short term connotation of a cost-benefit analysis, this study argues 
that states are more forward-looking than often claimed. With the aim of maintaining 
sovereignty stable, states’ consideration of power-sharing agreements and similar 
agreements are expression of long – term strategies. As SDMs pose a considerable threat 
to national sovereignty, which can significantly trouble power relations as well as regular 
life, a long term view becomes a necessary and rational approach to self-determination 
conflicts. Already in 1987, in ‘Morals by Agreement’ David Gauthier argued that rational 
individuals will aim for maximizing the relative concessions they have to make in order 
to obtain an agreement. Hale (2008: 32) has pointed out that “rationality means that 
people not only maximize utility, but remain consistent in their definition of what exactly 
generates utility”. In situations of self-determination conflicts this means that sovereignty 
represents maximized utility and a well-defined cost benefit analysis embodies the 
mechanism which enables (the maintenance of) sovereignty. Scholars have emphasised 
the complexities of strategic choice problems (e.g. Pruitt, 1983; Butler & Cunningham, 
2011) and some came to the conclusion that governments’ likeliness to fight against a 
separatist group when “the number of future challengers and the potential long term 
losses from challenges are high” (Walter, 2006: 314). Long term strategies, based on cost 
– benefit analysis, are therefore the natural driving force of states trapped in the decision 
making process.22  
 Clearly, as all multilateral negotiations, negotiations with SDMs largely depend 
on the negotiation process and the willingness of both actors to reach a conclusion.  
 
4. Group Fragmentation  
 
In Chapter 4, the emphasis is on the concept of group fragmentations, inter-factional 
dynamics and its various implications for the self-determination process.  
                                                 
22 For scholars who support the idea of states’ long term calculations in conflict situations, see e.g. Walter 
(2006).  
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4.1 Internal Fragmentation of Self-determination Movements  
 
Recent considerations of SDMs as fragmented actors rather than unitary, have changed 
the way of how researcher examine self-determination conflicts. The history of struggles 
for self-governance and recognition shows that the relentless drive of these groups often 
coincides with them splintering, changing, merging and dividing again (Pearlman & 
Cunningham, 2011: 4). In order to be able to understand how fragmentation can affect the 
self-determination process and the state’s decision making process, all doubt about the 
concept of group fragmentation need to be cleared. As already hinted at above, self-
determination conflicts refer to disputes between a state and a SDM. This movement is 
divided into different factions and while the overall movement represents certain 
common characteristics, which can range from a shared identity over a shared nationality 
to the aim to influence the overall self-determination process, the various factions are 
disagreeing on other aspects, such as leadership, organizational structure or the modus 
operandi of the other factions. The nature of these factions can range from small 
nonviolent groups over “armed groups, paramilitary organizations, […] or civic 
organizations” to political parties (Cunningham, Bakke, & Seymour, 2012a: 71). Tarrow 
(1998) further adds that “among other possible cleavages, nationalist movements and 
organizations often fragment internally along radical and moderate lines over what 
constitutes appropriate means and desirable ends” (Gupta, 2002: 1).   
The paragraph above hints at a key characteristic of fragmentation, namely, that 
factions are not static. Just as the self-determination conflict itself, the factions within the 
SDM evolve and change over time (Warren & Troy, 2011: 5). Some factions split, others 
might join to form a stronger unit and others again might choose to take the side of the 
government. This last example has been famously coined by Kalyvas (2008) as ethnic 
defection and referred to as a process whereby “individuals join organizations explicitly 
opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify” (S. N. 
Kalyvas, 2008: 1045). Consequently, these individuals will end up disrupting their ethnic 
ties and so eventually fight against their co-ethnics. Notable cases involving East Timor, 
the Chechens and Muslim Kashmiris exemplify Kalyvas’ argument and show how 
fragmentation can impact the level of violence and consequently alter the nature of the 
self-determination conflict. These dynamics are examined below.  
4.1.1 Effects of Fragmentation 
 
The effects of fragmentation on the self-determination conflict and on the state’s decision 
making process are numerous. Most of them, however, link back to two major themes: 
violence and pressures.  
Violence has always been a part of conflict. Especially ethnic and interstate wars 
are declared to be “exceedingly violent and intractable” (Kalyvas, 2008: 1044).23 It is 
therefore not surprising to find it as a key variable in self-determination conflicts and 
equally in those with a fragmented SDM. The question here is, however, how 
fragmentation is related to the use of violence. The following four points outline the 
                                                 
23 See also Horowitz (1985) for detailed information about ethnic conflicts.  
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effects of fragmentation in relation to violence and the complementary connection with 
pressures. 
First, fragmentation encourages the use of vertical and horizontal violence. 
Fragmentation of a SDM builds on the idea that there are at least two factions within that 
movement. Hostilities can thus be not only the result of the various factions fighting 
against their opposition, the state, (vertical violence) but they can also represent the 
consequences of fighting among the factions (horizontal violence). The strategic targeting 
of civilians needs to added to this dyadic use of violence. It developed into a common 
tool in self-determination disputes and conflicts in general, as it allows the parties to take 
over and appropriate needed resources, frame the opposition as particularly brutal and 
subsequently gain influence. By taking the Palestinian national movement as an example, 
Pearlman pointed out that fragmentation has resulted in increased targeting of civilians in 
war (Pearlman, 2009).   
The fighting among factions or the strategic targeting of civilians shows that 
violence is used to follow goals which differ from the pursuit of self-determination. As 
mentioned, the factions’ interests range from gathering public support over establishing 
themselves as the dominant faction to establishing greater visibility. Not just state, but 
also nonstate actors, such as the factions of a SDM, can develop a rational strategy of 
how to accumulate resources. Intra – factional violence is thus often directed towards 
aims that differ from the original claim of the SDM. On the other hand, when intended 
towards impacting the process of self-determination, the fighting among the factions and 
the reciprocal ‘outbidding’ can have negative consequences to solutions of the dispute 
(e.g. Horowitz, 1985: 365; Pearlman, 2012: 27).The reasons lie in the fact that intra – 
factional competition for power can significantly hinder the peace process, as scholars as 
Stedman (1997) and Kydd and Walter (2002) concluded in their studies. Power struggles 
among fragmented SDMs have caused conflicts in Sri Lanka and Sudan to be particular 
violent. Strategic attacks by the spoilers impact the state’s position and its view of the 
opponent and thus threaten to pose a halt to the overall peace process (Andrew, Barbara, 
Kydd, & Walter, 2002). Pearlman goes further by adding that fragmentation does not 
simply challenge the path towards a settlement of the dispute, but it “ shapes their 
incentives […] in the first place” (Pearlman, 2009: 82).  
As outlined above, the internal dynamics of a fragmented organizational structure 
of a SDM can result in ethnic defection. The gesture of turning against co-ethics, stir 
anger and thus result in an increased level of violence between the factions supporting the 
SDM and the one’s associated with the government.  
Despite all the consideration above, the chance that factions might choose not to 
use violence should not be discarded that easily. It is because members of a SDM have 
contrasting views, e.g. on the use of violence, that they decide to loosen their ties with the 
others in the first place. Factions, which follow nonviolent strategies, will not give up on 
their beliefs, unless they are faced with existential threats. Nevertheless, even in these 
situations, fragmentation will still augment the chance that the constant contestation will 
escalate and then allow violence to enter the conflict.  
A second point outlining inter- group fragmentation and its possible violent 
results, concerns the impact of fragmentation on the involved parties. The state’s 
perception and way of handling group fragmentation differs from the conduct of the 
various factions. According to one strand of researchers, who strictly follow the “divide 
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and conquer” logic, states pursue the aim of inducing mechanisms to cause fragmentation 
to be able to defeat the opposition more easily (Findley & Rudloff, 2011: 6).24 In contrast, 
strong factions of the SDM might be interested to gather greater visibility and superior 
chances of a solution of the conflict, so that they might use violence as a tool to take over 
smaller and weaker factions. This would allow them to represent a greater amount of 
people and so increase their changes of being the one opponent with which the 
government decides to negotiate or even grant their claims for self-determination. 
Scholars of interstate conflicts have pointed out that the incentives for governments to 
accommodate claims of self-determination groups are higher, when the opponent is 
strong (D. E. Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009: 574). Strong factions25 
“are able to force concessions”, they can “mobilize large forces” (D. E. Cunningham et 
al., 2009: 574) rapidly and thus represent a greater threat to national sovereignty than 
weaker factions. These inter – factional dynamics of SDM show that the acts aimed at 
diminishing or eliminating fragmentation are often built on violence.  
 Third, fragmentation exacerbates commitment problems and information 
asymmetries. Since the nature of a fragmented SDM is the co-existence of factions which 
disagree on one or more points, communication among these factions can be rather scarce. 
In addition, the level of trust in the information received from others and in the promises 
made among the factions is low. As violence further complicates the inter-factional 
relations, hesitations and consequent commitment problems as well as an information 
asymmetry are a natural consequence. Cunningham (2006) has pointed out that 
information asymmetries are more intense in multiparty conflicts.  Fearon (2004) adds to 
this, by stating that commitment problems pose a serious obstacle to conflict resolution.  
The fourth and final point connects the concept of violence to one of pressures. 
As fragmentation creates violence and complexities among the various factions, a 
reaction from the direct as well as indirect environment is a logical consequence. The 
reaction can manifest itself in various forms, ranging form non – violent protest to trade 
sanctions from international partners. On national territory the government in charge 
might be faced with criticism coming from opponent political parties on one hand, but 
also human rights organizations, as well as the overall population. The news will report 
these incidents of national unrest, protest and growing violence and through the means of 
social media even countries with a strict and repressive regime will need to confront the 
international community. Even if the situation might be caused by actions happening 
within the national boarders and is thus a matter subjected to national sovereignty, the 
international community would unlikely be willing to accept ongoing human rights 
violations and hostilities. Fragmentation does therefore ‘invite’ outside interference.26 
The triggered mechanisms of fragmentation put internal and external pressures on 
the state and its national government. As the political order threatens to be altered, the 
power relations are changing as well. The rational state will be confronted with internal 
and external threats to its sovereignty. These threats are perceived as internal and external 
                                                 
24 The split within Uganda’s WNBF caused the deaft of this and the faction that split from it, the UNRF II 
(Findley & Rudloff, 2011: 4).  
25 The study of Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009) refers to rebel groups, rather than to factions.  
26 Outside interference is here understood as the introduction of ‘outside actors’ into the discussions ( or 
negotiations or conflict) of the disputing partners. All entities not involved in the conflict represent ‘outside 
actors’.  
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pressures by the state and as such they can significantly impact the state. If the state 
decides to repress the violence by restoring to violence, fragmentation and the overall 
consequences will be exaggerated even further. The state can thus be expected to react 
and depending on the value at stake decide whether to grant an agreement or not. Clearly, 
ongoing violence and increasing pressures might push the state to agree to some 
accommodation. Scholars have repeatedly outlined the ‘effectiveness’ of violence (e.g. 
(Pape, 2003) and the strength of pressure through less violent means (e.g (Stephan et al., 
2008). It is important to point out that some countries might feel the need to give in to an 
agreement with just low levels of violence present. This is because of the pressures a 
SDM creates through its nature. SDMs and its factions are the result of groups which feel 
that their rights are undermined and violated. Before SDM avail themselves of the use of 
violence, their means of pushing for their goals can be assumed to be non – violent. Since 
the interest of the factions of the SDM to achieve these goals is to be taken as serious and 
sincere, the use of violence would be counterproductive in initial phase of the conflict. 
After all the claims of rational actors need to be presented and only after a reaction (or no 
reaction) of the national government, the SDM and its factions can be expected to act.  
 These considerations lead to the conclusion that even though the fragmentation is 
an internal mechanism of a SDM, it has effects which can reach far beyond its immediate 
surroundings. Fragmentation generates complexities and mechanisms which preclude the 
parties involved from a rapid and smooth conclusion of the hostilities between them. The 
state’s recognition of being involved in multilateral negotiations, rather than bilateral 
ones, adds to the governments understanding of how to address the opposition. 
Cunningham (2006) adds to that argument by pointing out that in multilateral conflicts, 
the change of an agreement is more difficult as there are “multiple actors with distinct 
preferences” (Cunningham, 2006: 875). Consequently the range of acceptable agreements 
is smaller and difficulties of ‘agreeing to an agreement’ are higher. This implies that if 
states decide to agree to accommodate the claims of the SDM, then the concessions 
would be rather small. Multiple factions can however be expected to present more than 
one claim.27 Numerous demands from a mulitude of factions put the state in front of the 
choice of which demands to accommodate. As a rational actor, the state will conduct a 
cost benefit analysis and by taking into account factors such as violence and pressues and 
their potential as a threat to sovereingy, the governement will make a decision. A closer 
look at the self-determination conflicts in Sri Lanka and Banglasdesh will allow a in 
depth analysis of group fragmentation and its effects.  
 
4.2 Case Analysis 
 
This analysis will examine the self-determination conflicts in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
and outline the impact of fragmentation on the overall decision making process of the 
                                                 
27 As outlined above, for a variety of reasons (e.g. organizational structure, personal preferences, and 
educational barriers) not all of the factions might present claims. On the contrary, depending on the 
dynamics and relationship among the factions, one faction might be particularly strong and therefore be 
able to influence the other factions actions. The likelihood of only one factional demand in a highly 
fractionalized SDM, is however rather unlikely.  
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national governments. After an analysis of the fragmentation and its effects in both cases, 
a conclusion will shed light on the findings of each of the two cases.  
4.2.1. Sri Lanka 
 
The civil war in Sri Lanka represents the first case analysis in this study. First, the overall 
group fragmentation of the Tamils, the SDM will be outlined. Then the effects and 
implications of the fragmentation will be delineated.  
4.2.1.1 Intra-group fragmentation in Sri Lanka   
The self-determination conflict in Sri Lanka is one of the best known examples of self-
determination conflict. This is not only due to its length of almost 30 years, but also due 
to its particularly violent nature and dynamics. Yet, Sri Lanka witnessed one of the ‘most 
institutionalized, systematic and sustained peace negotiations [that] have occurred during 
the history of the civil war’ (Goodhand, Korf & Spencer, 2011:1). The following analysis 
of Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, including the highly organized LTTE, will shed light on the 
concept of fragmentation and the factors which denied the SDM of the fulfilment of its 
claims.  
 In the second half of the 1980s, when the Sri Lanka rebellion achieved levels of 
intensive conflict, the LTTE became known as the leading Tamil rebel group.28 The 
LTTE perceived itself as the faction who embodies best Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority. 
While the LTTE was not the only group fighting for self-determination, it was initially 
the one which represented an extremely cohesive structure (Höglund, 2005: 163). It is 
therefore not surprising that the three most prominent forms of violence involve around 
the LTTE and refer to the use of vertical, horizontal, and internal violence (within the 
LTTE).  
First, the LTTE and the other factions claiming to represent the Tamils found 
themselves in contrast with the national Sinhalese – dominated government. As the above 
outlined historical background shows, the start of the hostilities refers back to 1983 when 
“anti-Tamil violence spread across the country” (Höglund, 2005: 159). However, 
historians have pointed out that the conflict goes back to the state-building phase, when 
the Tamils were denied an “independent Tamil state in the north and east of country” and 
national reform were favoring Sinhalese, which allowed them to gain support (Höglund, 
2005: 159). Similar anti-Tamil initiatives add to the great emphasis the Sri Lankan 
government put on ethnic outbidding (e.g. Devotta, 2005) 
In 1971 and in 1987-89 the left-wing Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was 
responsible for a violent upheaval (Haniffa, Abeygunawardana, 2008: iii). At the same 
time the violence between the LTTE and other Tamil factions steadily increased until the 
ceasefire agreement was signed in Oslo in 2002. Despite the agreement and the tsunami, 
which in other situation have successfully brought conflicts to an end, the violence did 
not end. Rather, the Sri Lankan military added violence to the already overflowing 
number of hostilities (e.g. Höglund, 2005).  
                                                 
28 The LTTE openly fought the Sri Lankan government since 1983 (Lilja, 2009: 307) 
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Second, the Tamil movement was highly fractionalized. Much of the violence 
throughout the conflict can be attributed to the high levels of violent actions of the LTTE 
against other Tamil groups (Uyangoda, 2007: 9). Besides the LTTE, factions representing 
the Tamils were the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which included the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam 
People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) and the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil 
Eelam (PLOTE) and many more. According to Cunningham, Bakke & Seymour (2012a), 
there were up to 20 different factions active throughout the conflict.29 The Tamil SDM of 
Sri Lanka can therefore, in reference to the concept and variations of group fragmentation 
explained above, be described a extremely fragmented movement. This hits at hypothesis 
2 outlined above, which claims that the greater the number of factions, the less likely is a 
state to agree. In the 1980s, the Tamil militancy was built around five major faction – the 
LTTE, PLOT, TELO, ERPRLF and EROS” (Staniland, 2012: 31). While initial 
outbidding caused frequent violent conflict, most of these factions of the Tamil 
movement lost great influence after the signifying of the ceasefire in 2001 (Höglund, 
2005: 164). Moreover, the Tamil factions suffered significantly from the dominant status 
of the LTTE on the island. Any attempts of gaining of influence of smaller Tamil groups 
were systematically suppressed through violent measures by the LTTE. According to 
statements of various Tamil groups, the violence of the LTTE significantly increased 
after March 2004. The violent encounters between the two Tamil factions in Batticaloa 
and the surrounding areas in July 2004 caused the death of a dozen people. Some groups 
also turned sides and showed support for the government (e.g Bush, 1993:15; Staniland, 
2012: 31). These behavioral decisions embody the above explained concept of ethnic 
defection.  
Third, the LTTE witnessed internal splits. Despite that, the LTTE’s leader, 
Velupillai Prabakharan, who died on May 18, 2009, was known for his strict guidance 
and forceful diversion of any challenges to the movement itself (Goodhand, Korf & 
Spencer, 2011:1). Nevertheless, also the LTTE witnessed splits. In March 2004, a faction 
lead by Karuna Amman, a military commander from the east of the country, broke away 
and formed a new Tamil party, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) (Höglund, 
2005: 163). The split brought about heavy fighting initiated by the LTTE command in 
Vanni, the northern part of Sri Lanka, and attacks on the Karuna faction.30 After the 
breakaway of Karuna from the LTTE, the latter drastically changed its approach towards 
future operations and did not hesitate to demonstrate his determination of acting as the 
main governing force in the north and east of the country. Consequently, the LTTE 
negatively approached any the suggestions and proposals offered by the negotiating and 
mediating parties, they equally lost any bargaining availability and their the ceasefire 
violations increased (Jagannathan, 2011).  
 
“The negative impact of the LTTE’s ceasefire violations goes beyond 
the specific incidents themselves. It becomes very difficult for any Sri 
Lankan government to push ahead with the peace process at the same 
                                                 
29 Even though not all factions were active at the same time. See Appendix for an overview of the number 
of factions within self-determination conflicts.  
30 As this shows, there is no clear distinction between the various aspects of the use of violence. One action 
(e.g internal LTTE split) is linked to another (e.g. increased fighting among Tamil factions).  
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time that clear and regular LTTE violations of it are taking 
place”(Höglund, 2005: 167) 
 
Stated analyst Jehan Perera. Höglund explained this specific behavior of defensive 
conservatism combined with the use of violence by referring to the asymmetrical nature 
of the conflict (Höglund, 2005: 162). In situations, such as the one of the LTTE in Sri 
Lanka, the national government finds itself in a clear position of superiority, which 
causes the weaker party – the LTTE- to restore to the means available to exercise some 
kind of pressure or have sort of impact, which very often are protest, refusal and in 
situations of intense conflict, the use of violence. Some state it is an almost necessary part 
of the negotiation process (Höglund, 2005: 162). 
After the defeat of the Karuna forces, the voices grew louder that the LTTE 
wanted to increase its influence in the east. Yet, the LTTE carefully insisted that the split 
was to be seen as a single incident and motivated by an individual choice, rather than the 
sign of a greater movement. Scholars have proposed a series of explanations for Karuna’s 
motivation of turning his back to the LTTE (Höglund, 2005: 163). Some argue that 
“factional elites defect when fellow militants threaten their survival and exit option” 
(Pearlman & Cunningham, 2011:9). The prevailing opinion draws on a different 
argument, according to which the Tamils residing in the east were being marginalized 
and coincides so with the rationale of the military commander Karuna: “fighters from the 
east were not being treated properly by the northern-based leadership”(AFP, 2004). The 
split of the Karuna faction of the LTTE surprised not only the LTTE itself, but also the 
reigning Sri Lankan government and the Norwegian mediators involved at that stage of 
the conflict. The latter interpreted the split as an internal matter of the LTTE and did 
therefore not take a clear position. While the Sri Lankan government refused to negotiate 
with the Karun faction, the Norwegians referred to the incidence as an internal issue of 
LTTE and therefore out of there sphere of responsibility, which only was to concern 
mediation efforts between the LTTE and the government (Höglund, 2005: 163).  
4.2.1.2 Effect of intra -group fragmentation on the self-determination conflict  
As the paragraphs above show, it is difficult to examine the concept of fragmentation 
without mentioning its violent consequences. High levels of violence are however not the 
only effect of a fragmented SDM.  
The dynamics of inter–Tamil relations and violence make it clear, why 
information symmetries as well as great credible commitments are difficult to reach. This 
does not only apply to those between the Tamils and the national government, but also 
between the different Tamil faction. The modus operandi of the LTTE precludes it from 
being seen as a credible negotiation partner, be it for official negotiations or matters of a 
minor concern. Crenshaw outlines that “distrust between the former belligerent is too 
great and the incentives for defection from cooperation are too high” (Crenshaw, 2000: 
135). Instances in the self-determination conflict of Sri Lanka have shown this. In 2004, 
for instance, the LTTE suspected the government to be responsible for a number of 
killings. Later was however revealed by a journalist, Amanatha Perera, that there was 
evidence suggesting that the Tamil rebels belonging to the Karuna faction had a base on 
the government-held territory, from which attacks had been launched (Höglund, 2005: 
163). Similar situations of mistrust between the LTTE and its former eastern Karun 
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faction significantly added to the escalation of the conflict. The consequences of the 
internal division of the LTTE became a great national and international issue when in 
February 2005, E. Kaushalyan, the political leader of LTTE, operating in the country’s 
east, was killed – allegedly by close followers of Karuna (BBC, 2005). 
Another factor which deserves attention is the concept of internal and external 
pressures. Crenshaw examined the case of Sri Lanka and pointed out that “the initial 
decision to intervene is more oriented toward strategic interests, while staying in and 
getting out [i.e. intervention] are more sensitive to domestic pressures” (Crenshaw, 2000: 
135). Accordingly Crenshaw suggests that “pressures shape intervention polities and 
outcomes” (Crenshaw, 2000: 135). This hints to an important fact – that fragmentation 
and the so caused pressure invite intervention. However, as outlined above, these outside 
actors can further add to the complications and consequently increase the level of 
violence. Also in the case of Sri Lanka this was the case. The intervention of India31 in 
the 1980s had similar consequences and – even though short term successes – the long 
term result was negative. It caused India since then to opt for a ‘hands – off – policy’ in 
Sri Lanka (Goodhand, Korf & Spencer, 2011: 41). Only in carefully timed moments and 
situations, negotiations can be successful.32 
Internal pressures were also exercised through mass protests (e.g. The New York 
Times, 2005; The Asian Tribune, 2007; Sri Lanka Guardian, 2008). Objective internal 
media reports condemning the consequences of the use of violence of all parties involved 
in the conflict rare, since the media is repressed by the government (Commonwealth 
Journalist Association, 2012).  
Numerous international organizations have since urged the Sri Lankan 
government to end the conflict through peaceful means. External pressures have been 
exercised through the reports of major foreign media, (e.g. BCC, The Economist, The 
New York Times, Die Zeit, The Guardian and many more), as well as from numerous 
international organizations (e.g The United Nations) and non-governmental organizations 
(e.g. Minority Rights Group International, Amnesty International). 33  In addition, a 
number of governments expressed their concerns about the ongoing human rights 
violations in Sri Lanka (e.g. United States, Australia).  
4.2.2 The Ethnic People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
 
The second case study focuses on the ethnic people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 
Bangladesh. Scholarly research on the conflict and the internal fragmentation is very 
scarce and therefore the information available is limited.  
4.2.2.1 Intra –group fragmentation in the CHT of Bangladesh 
                                                 
31 India decided to intervened, because it feared that the conflict in Sri Lanka would ‘spill over’ and 
motivate the Tamils in India to follow similar aims of self-governance. It was therefore a security-based 
decision (Goodhand, Korf & Spencer, 2011: 40-1) 
32 See Zartman (2001) for more information about ‘ripe moments’ and ‘hurting stalemate’.  
33 Due to space limitation it is not possible to give detailed information about the contribution of each 
media entity. The same applies to the numerous reports issued by the international and non – governmental 
organizations.  
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The self-determination conflict in the CHT troubles Bangladesh for over two decades. 
The great number of ethnic groups and the value of the CHT, a strategically important 
region with rich natural resources34, have transformed the CHT into an area prone for 
conflict.  
 The SDM of the CHT is not, as in Sri Lanka, more or less ethnically coherent. It 
rather consists of a variety of factions with represent different ethnic groups and are 
aiming at the achievement of different goals. Pearlman and Cunningham (2012: 4) 
outline that some of the groups “were armed groups with a separatist agenda, while 
others were social associations working peacefully for civil rights”. Accordingly, people 
belonging to the Khumi did not get involved in the self-determination conflicts. They 
“remained outside the regional conflict, political polarization in state affairs and 
transmission of power from Mughal to British, British to Pakistan and Pakistan to 
Bangladesh” (Uddin, 2008: 51). Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour (2012a) point out that 
during the self-determination struggle in the CHT there were up to eight different 
faction.35  
 The government to use the inter- group fragmentation of the CHT SDM, by trying 
to stimulate a ethnic defection within the Chakma, who constitute approximately 60 % of 
the Jumma (Levene, 1999: 367). Moreover, official state forces put efforts into utilizing 
smaller tribes and motivating them to turn against the Chakma (Levene, 1999: 367). 
Moreover, Mey (1980) points out that some of the groups, such as the Tanchangya, have 
their own armed force, which is independent of the SB.  
4.2.2.2 Effects of Inter-group fragmentation  
While the concrete actions between the various factions are essentially undocumented, 
the effects of the SDMs fragmentation are more evident.  
 The violent incidents between the various factions and state officials of the 
government of Bangladesh were numerous. Scholars of the CHT conflict have outlined 
the great human rights violations committed by all parities involved in the conflict (e.g ). 
Some even have taken the concept even further by referring to genocide (Levene, 1999; 
Rahaman Khan, Khan, Kaisar, 1994). Numerous disputes also took place between the 
factions of the SDM and the Benaglis, which were settled in the CHT, as they presented a 
“major impediment to the peace process in the region” (Mohsin, 2003: 99). The Jumma 
people perceived them as a threat to their lands and multiple times asked the government 
for them to withdraw (Mohsin, 2003: 100). The Benagalis on the other hand, accused the 
Jumma of being hostile. One of the most brutal escalations was the 1980 Kalampati 
massacre, which caused the deaths of more than 300 Jummas (The Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Commission, 1991: 16). A subsequent inquire discovered that the killings were executed  
 The hostilities in the CHT caused the concern of the civil society of Bangladesh. 
Following the 1980 Kalampati massacre, which caused the deaths of, citizens by state 
officials, the Bangladesh army, together with Bengalis, residing in the CHT (Arens & 
Chakma, 2002). Gruesome actions like this explains the initial silencing of the civilians. 
                                                 
34 The natural resources of the CHT include gas, coal, copper and (presumably) oil deposits (Mohsin, 2003: 
16).  
35 See Appendix, Table 1 for an overview of self-determination struggles and the number of factions 
between them.  
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However, starting from the late 1980s, civil –right organizations, as well as human right 
activists, repeatedly reported about the hostile conditions in the CHT. Moreover, 
prominent Bengali figures, such as such as poet Shamsur Rahman and the politician 
Rashed Khan Menon, openly denounced the conflict (Arens & Chakma, 2002). The 
consequence of the active involvement of different organizations and people, out 
considerable pressure on the government of Bangladesh.  
 By the 1980s, the conflict resulted also in external pressures. Even though the 
conflict did not see any outside parties to intervene in the conflict (Mohsin, 2003: 15), 
outside actors still played a great role, as they were sending aid to the country. They 
therefore had the means to pressure Bangladesh towards a solution of the self-
determination conflict. Aid supporters 36  of Bangladesh included Japan, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany, Switzerland, the European Commission 
(EC) and the United States (Mohsin, 2003: 14). In addition, Amnesty International 
published regularly updates on the human rights violations in the CHT. An additional fall 
down of Bangladesh’s international standing was a great fear of the national government. 
Reports of international mechanisms, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) shed light on the 
deteriorating situation of the Jumma. It was because of these in- and external pressures  
that - while still undermined with violent actions - the overall willingness to consider the 
demands of the Jumma people of the CHT was relatively high (in comparison with Sri 
Lanka).  
4.3 Conclusion  
 
What caused Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to respectively grant self- determination to the 
CHT, but not to the Tamils? Both cases were subjected to the group fragmentation of the 
SDM. Equally, both cases witness high levels of violence, not only between the state and 
the factions, but also between the various factions. This resulted in in – and external 
pressures for the national governments of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Despite these 
similarities, the outcomes of the self-determination struggles are – so far- different. While 
the case of Bangladesh agrees with both of the hypothesis, the Sri Lankan case does not 
fit the argument as well. Nevertheless, even here the hypothesis 2, is confirmed. The 
analysis allows the examining of two case with great communalities, but also some 
differences.  
 First, factions of the SDM in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as well as the national 
government, have suffered from the great amount of violence. The intra-group 
fragmentation has caused the parties of the conflict to be involved in horizontal as well as 
in the vertical use of violence. The human cost for both countries during their decade 
long struggles is said to revolved around 100,000 (ABC, 2009) in Sri Lanka and multiple 
ten thousands in Bangladesh (Levene, 1999). Because of their duration and the level of 
fragmentation of the SDMS, both conflicts were particularly wearisome. Yet, a 
distinctions needs to be made between the extreme fragmentation of the Tamils 
movement and the highly fragmented Jummas. As mentioned above, researches 
(Cunningham, Bakke & Seymour, 2012a) have studied the level of fragmentation in self-
                                                 
36 Aid is here understood as contributions aimed at national development or similar projects.  
 34
determination conflicts and came to the result that there were up 20 different factions 
active in Sri Lanka, and 8 in the CHT.37 Second, the in- and external pressures exercised 
on the central governments in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh were high. However, in contrast 
to the CHT conflict, Sri Lanka’s self-determination dispute was majorly present in the 
national and foreign media. This put great pressure on the Sri Lankan government, its 
international relations and its national sovereignty. Similarly, Bangladesh’s international 
aid supporters pressured the country to end the conflict. They, mainly great democratic 
powers, did not want to invest their money in a highly unstable region (Mohsin, 2003: 
14). Yet, the two governments chose different options when it came to the claims of self-
governance. Both decisions show a rational strategy. In the case of the Jummas of the 
CHT, the government was clear about not wanting to decrease its influence the eastern 
part of its country. The vast natural resource of the CHT, represented an interesting 
incentive for the state. Official forces did not have access to the resources during the time 
of the conflict (Mohsin, 2003: 16). An agreement, granting the Jumma,  or Adivasi, as the 
Bengali refer to the Jumma people, would not only quiet the external pressure on the 
country, but also eliminate the mistrust of the Bangladesh’s economic partners. Also, it 
would be still possible for them to control the resources and profit from them. In addition, 
the logistically strategy location of the CHT only strengthen that point. 
 The position of Sri Lanka’s Tamil factions was somewhat different. The 
government was not ready to give in to the high set demands of independence and 
consequently loose all ties to for the island’s north and east. With the progressing of the 
conflict, the overwhelming level of violence created serious commitment problems. The 
government did not have a rational incentive to let part of its country go. Its option for a 
‘no agreement’ was therefore based on a rational cost benefit calculation. Also, Sri Lanka 
was aware of India’s fear, which was based on the idea that a positive outcome (an 
agreement) for the Tamil SDM in Sri Lanka could cause in its neighboring country 
(Mohsin, 2003: 14). India’s fear was based on the assumption that an agreement would 
encourage its local Tamils to raise their concerns and demands as well. Yet, that was not 
the case. This shows that state often pursue a more long term goal – good relations with 
its immediate neighbours – than often expected.  
 These considerations make it possible to re – examine the hypothesis outlined in 
the Chapter 2. Hypothesis 1 assumed that internal group fragmentation increases the 
likelihood of states agreeing to an agreement (concessions). The second hypothesis was 
based on the argument that the greater the number of factions within a SDM, the smaller 
will be the level of concessions that the state will agree to [not satisfying or no 
agreement]. The case of Sri Lanka followed the hypothesized causal path according to 
which violence and pressures have an effect on the self-determination process. The Sri 
Lankan government did however opt for ‘no agreement’. The military defeat of the LTTE 
and the other Tamils factions in 2009 does however not preclude the possibility that the 
state will still agree to an accommodation and to a certain level of protection of the 
Tamils in the future. Recent media accounts reported to the gaining influence of Sri 
Lanka’s largest Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) (BBC, 2012). In July 
2011 the TNA won two thirds of local councils in the country’s north and east (BBC, 
2012). An explanation for the failure to reach an agreement (or the state’s rational 
decision of protecting national sovereignty) could be the disputable standing of the Sri 
                                                 
37 For an overview of the factions within SDM, see Appendix, Table 1.  
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Lankan government towards granting the Tamils regional autonomy. Moreover, ethnic 
outbidding has been pointed out as one of the key elements to hinder successful 
negotiations in Sri Lanka. As for the second hypothesis, which assumes that the greater 
number of factions results in a lower level of concessions, the argument applies to the 
case. Sri Lanka is one of the self-determination with the greatest number of factions, as 
Table 1 in the Annex shows. As with every additional actor, also the complexities rise 
and therefore add to the already twisted nature of self-determination conflicts and group 
fragmentation, it is therefore not that surprising that the ‘intractable’ conflict of Sri Lanka 
does not perfectly match the theory.  
Due to scarce scholarly evidence, a thorough analysis of CHT self-determination 
conflict in Bangladesh represents a challenge. Nevertheless, the case of Bangladesh has 
shown that group fragmentation and its resulting effects make it possible to reach an 
agreement. Moreover, the Jumma people were not as highly fractionalized as the Tamil 
SDM movement and therefore their agreement was welcomed by them. It should be 
mentioned that as of June 2012, the situation in the CHT is not entirely stable and 
peaceful. This does however, not affect the argument of why states agree with some SDM, 
but not with others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study has outlined the complex dynamics of self-determination movements, the 
effects of inter-factional disputes and the consequences on the overall self-determination 
process. By examining the behavioral patterns and choices of the states through the lens 
of rationalism, it became clear that while strategies are formed on a cost benefit analysis 
and rational choices, states often pursue a more forward looking aim, than expected.  
 Group fragmentation and its inherent nature of conflict can set in motion 
mechanisms, which only rarely can be foreseen, This thesis has however proven that 
group fragmentation in self-determination movements often results in violence and 
conflict. While in other circumstances this might lead to no positive outcome, an increase 
of violence, combined with in – and external pressures that are exercised by civil society, 
states or international organizations, can result in the accommodation of the claims of 
self-determination.  
At the same point it is however important to point out that this study does not 
preclude the possibility of cohesive movements to be able to get self determination. It 
does only state that fragmentation clearly has major impacts on the self-determination 
process and therefore also on the decision a state is willing to take. Further research needs 
to be conducted on the connections between the issue of internal cohesion as well as 
fragmentation and its ties to self-determination conflicts.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Overview of self-determination conflicts and the respective factions involved 
(Cunningham, Bakke & Seymour, 2012a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
